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Abstract  
This paper challenges the widely held notion that the developments in computing are 
sufficient to explain the recent turn to applied economics. Developments in computer 
hardware were undoubtedly necessary, and they were sufficient to ensure that there were 
significant changes in economists’ practices, but to explain how and why economics changed, 
other factors need to be considered. It conjectures that the most profound effect of the 
increased availability of computers may have been to challenge the boundary between theory 
and applied work. 
 
Keywords:  Computers, Information technology, Economics, Econometrics, Applied 
economics, Software, Simulation. 
 
 
1 We are grateful to conference participants and to Jeff Biddle, Marcel Boumans, Stephanie 
Dick, Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat and Glen Weyl for extremely helpful discussions and 
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JEL Codes:  B20, B23, B40, C00, C63. 
1. The problem 
 
 Economists generally explain the turn towards applied economics that has taken place 
in the past thirty to forty years by saying that it is the result of better data and more powerful 
computers. For instance, Justin Wolfers and Betsey Stevenson 2012 state that “computing 
power has made it extremely easy and cheap to analyse all the data you produce. An 
economist with a laptop can, in a matter of seconds, do the kind of number crunching it used 
to take a roomful of Ph.D.’s weeks to achieve. Just a few decades ago, economists used 
punch cards to program data analysis for their empirical studies. The result has been a boom 
in empirical research.” Likewise, Justin Fox noted, in a recent column, that “one cause seems 
pretty clear. The biggest shift toward empirical work occurred between 1983 and 1993, and it 
was between 1983 and 1993 that personal computers became commonplace.”2  
 
Indeed, the consequences of computers for economics have been dramatic. They 
opened the door to the implementation of techniques which for years had been no more than a 
dream: bigger matrices could be solved, therefore more complex models could be analyzed; 
Monte Carlo simulations became possible, as were statistical techniques such as Multinomial 
Probit models, Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimation; and many others. They 
also produced a radical transformation in the working practices of economists: in the 1970s, 
computation using hand or desk calculators gave way to writing computer code, card 
                                                                                                                                                  
suggestions. 
2 http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-08-06/business-is-booming-in-empirical-
economics and http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2016-01-06/how-economics-went-
from-theory-to-data 
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punching and data input, waiting hours for mainframe computers to execute programs, then 
reading rolls of paper containing the output and often plotting results by hand. Today all of 
this can be done using the keyboard and mouse of a computer featuring a graphical user 
interface. It is possibly because the effect of computers appears so obvious, that there are few 
historical works documenting the nature and extent of such influence, and those works that 
do exist focus on the use of computers for the estimation and testing of econometric relations 
(see Renfro 2011 and references therein) 
 
 The claim that “it’s all computers” suggests that economists knew what they wanted 
to do but yet were held back by a lack of computing power. The history of economics is thus 
riven with economists’ statements about how the advent of new technology would enable 
them to solve long-standing problems. For example, in 1948, Leontief thought the ENIAC 
could soon “tell you what kind and amount of public works were needed to pump-prime your 
way out of a depression,” and in 1962, Daniel Suit wrote that with the aid of the IBM 1620, 
“we can use models of indefinite size, limited only by the available data” (cited in Halsmayer 
2016 and Renfro 2003 respectively). In 1971, Rand’s analysts Charles Wolf and John Enns 
explained that computers had provided a “bridge” between “formal theory” and “databases.” 
In the late 1980s, Jerome Friedman (1989) believed statisticians had the ability to compensate 
for unverifiable assumptions. In practice, however, the relationship has been much more 
complex. It shows no correlation between the level of computational intensity of a modeling 
approach and its rise in the prestige hierarchy of the discipline since the 1970s. Two of the 
most computationally demanding approaches in 1960s and 1970s were computational (or 
applied) general equilibrium (CGE/AGE) and large-scale Keynesian macro-econometric 
modeling, and yet, just as improvements in hardware made it possible to remove some of the 
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simplifications and approximation that constraints on computing power had previously 
dictated, enthusiasm for these approaches waned.  The eventual outcome of the 
methodological battles of the 1970s and 1980s concerning econometric techniques, 
identification strategies and meaningful tests was the rise of quasi-experimental techniques, 
which were much less computationally intensive techniques than many of the methods used 
earlier.3  
 
 A second problem with the“it’s-all-computers” trope is that it presumes that 
computerization is more important for applied work than for theory; yet computerization had 
the potential to transform theory as well as applied work, as it did in the natural sciences. For 
example, biologists used computer simulations to show how something as complex as an eye 
could have been the result of a gradual evolutionary process (see Dawkins 1996, chapter 5). 
If this has not happened in economics, or if economists and computer scientists have begun to 
come together only in the past decade, as suggested by recent papers and special issues of 
journals (see Blume et al. 2015) it is important to ask why it evolved in this way. The 
common response also avoids questions of how the rise of computing may be connected to 
changes in the way theoretical and applied work are conceived. For example, simulations 
could be considered to be either theoretical or applied, or neither, depending on the nature of 
the work done and on how theory and application are conceived. There is the possibility that 
classifying certain types of computer-intensive work (for example simulations) as “applied” 
may reflect a conception of economic theory that has been called into question by the 
emergence of new research practices. 
 
3 Computers were nevertheless important to the success of such methods because of they 
made it possible to collect, store and manage large quantities of data. 
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This paper tackles the question of how we might begin to think about these 
developments in the context of the broader changes in economics with which this volume is 
concerned. It starts by outlining a chronology for the spread of computerization within 
economics. This is essential, because the path to computerization was neither linear nor uni-
dimensional: there were sudden “leaps” in hardware performance, software production, and 
the evolution of practices; and increased computing power has involved not just advances in 
processing power but also innovations in data storage and retrieval, networking and visual 
displays. It then uses a list of the functions of computing as the basis for some arguments 
about the implications of computerization for the transformation of economics that has taken 
place in recent decades, and to analyze how the computer transformed the relationship 
between theory and application, or failed to do so.  
 
The evidence required to write a comprehensive history of the role of computing in 
economics is often hard to locate, with the result that our account is far from complete. We 
want to fill an important gap in the history of applied economics and to convince historians 
that careful attention needs to be paid to the role of the computer in their stories. However, 
we also want to persuade economists that a thorough account of how computers changed 
economics (and of how, sometimes, they failed to change economics) requires more 
testimonies and reminiscences from those who lived through the events that we discuss. 
Publications such as the Journal of Economic Measurement have strived to record 
economists’ reminiscences of their computation and technical practices but much of the 
material needed for a more comprehensive history remains buried in economists’ minds, 
never having made it into print.  
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2. Chronology  
 
1940s-1950s the quest for faster calculating machines 
 In 1946, the first general-purpose computer, the Electronic Numerical Integrator and 
Computer (ENIAC) became operational. In the next two years, John von Neumann and others 
wrote stored programs and ran Monte Carlo simulations in the course of modeling nuclear 
fission. However, economists’ interest in computing had come earlier. At Harvard, Wassily 
Leontief had used a mechanical computer at the start of his input-output project in the mid-
1930s, and by the mid 1940s, working together with the Bureau of Labor Statistics, he was 
using an electro-mechanical computer, the Harvard Mark II, to invert a 39x39 matrix.4 
Though this worked, to an accuracy that exceeded what von Neumann estimated was 
possible, it was a slow process, taking six weeks and baskets full of punched paper tape. 
During the Second World War, Guy Orcutt, then a graduate student at the University of 
Michigan, designed and built two “analogue electrical-mechanical” devices that could solve 
problems in duopoly and spatial economics (Watts 1991: 172). During the 1940s and early 
1950s, electrical analog computers developed rapidly and were used on a significant scale for 
simulation. Part of Orcutt’s doctoral thesis involved designing a “regression analyzer” that 
could estimate regression and correlation coefficients (Orcutt 1948). This machine was built 
after he was appointed to a position at MIT and it was used to study, amongst other things, 
 
4 http://herbmitchell.info/Chap7a.htm (accessed March 1, 2016). Discussion of Leontief 
draws on Halsmayer 
 (2016). 
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autocorrelated processes using Monte Carlo simulations (Orcutt and James 1948; Orcutt and 
Cochrane 1949). At the London School of Economics, Walter Newlyn and Bill Phillips 
worked on an hydromechanical analog computer.  In 1949, they came up with the MONIAC 
(Monetary National Income Analog Computer). This was sold as a teaching aid depicting the 
circular flow of income and is often taken to illustrate a naïve “hydraulic” Keyesianism. 
However, because it models the relationships between stocks and flows, with physical flows 
of water ensuring that these are modeled properly (for otherwise tanks will overflow) it was 
capable of analyzing complex relationships (see Vines 2000: 48-9). 
 
The years around 1950 produced great advances in econometric theory, with the 
development, at Cowles and elsewhere, of estimation methods and tests for goodness of fit. 
However, though computers existed, most economists had to rely on desktop calculators, 
which made meant that the spread of these computationally demanding techniques was slow 
(see for instance Durbin in Phillips 1988). A significant development in 1954 was the shift in 
estimating the Klein-Goldberger model, one of the earliest models of the United States 
economy, from desk calculators to a computer (Renfro 2004: 23). However, even then the 
shift was only partial, for in order to keep the task manageable and to check for accuracy, the 
computer was used to calculate certain moments with other tasks being performed manually. 
A significant issue was the accuracy of large calculations, which led to problems being 
linearized and broken down into sub-problems that could be solved reliably. Overall, the 
1950s can be pictured as a race between the increase in the computational power of 
mainframe computers and the creativity of researchers. Reflecting on the installation of an 
IBM 650 at Iowa State University in 1956, Raymond Beneke (1994,15) explained that, in 
1959, as soon as it was upgraded to accommodate 198 rows, linear programming became a 
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tool that economists could apply to a wide range of problems and multiple regression analysis 
became almost a free good in comparison with the previous situation. However, despite this, 
the pressure to improve computational capacity remained as economists expanded the range 
of problems they sought to tackle.  
In the 1950s computers were used not only for data analysis but also for what might 
be conceived as theoretical investigations (and in some of this work, as explained in Section 
3, the distinction between theory and application became very blurred). Herbert Simon and 
Allen Newell wrote the program “logic theorist”, implemented on the Johniac computer 
recently installed at RAND, which used symbolic manipulation to prove mathematical 
theorems—the beginnings of artificial intelligence (Dick 2015). In the Sloan School at MIT, 
Jay Forrester (1958) used an IBM 704 computer to simulate the effects of a ten per cent 
increase in retail sales in a dynamic system involving production, sales and inventory 
accumulation. An IBM computer (IBM 560) was also used by Irma and Frank Adelman to 
simulate the dynamic properties of the Klein-Goldberger model, an activity that arguably 
blurred the boundaries between empirical and theoretical research (Adelman and Adelman 
1959; Adelman undated). They were using an empirical model but were drawing conclusions 
about the ability of alternative theoretical models to generate lifelike data. 
 
Harnessing mainframe computers: programming, data management, and new modeling 
possibilities (1960s-1970s)  
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From the 1960s mainframe computers were used more widely not just because of 
falling prices but because of technical advances that made them more reliable.5 As 
economists’ access to computers increased, they began to write the software needed to 
perform statistical calculations, a development that was as important as advances in 
hardware. This software development was not something external to the developments in 
economics but reflected economists’ views on how research should be undertaken. At LSE, 
Dennis Sargan wrote Autocode for the Atlas computer, and the many additions by Evan 
Durbin, Michael Wickens and David Hendry exemplified LSE economists’ concern with tests 
for model specification. The development of GIVE (General Instrumental Variables 
Estimation) by Hendry in the late 1970s reflected the influence of general-to-specific 
methodology. At MIT and then Berkeley, Robert Hall, aided by Ray Fair, Robert Gordon, 
Charles Bischoff and Richard Sutch, developed TSP (Time Series Processor), while Ed Kuh 
and Mark Eisner worked on TROLL. Throughout the 1960s, the focus was on parameter 
estimation rather than on the human interface or data management. 
 
This focus on estimation began to change in the 1970s when data production and 
management became a primary concern for government and business. The Economic Council 
of Canada, which hosted Daniel McCracken’s DATABANK system, became a model for the 
US after the Ruggles Committee, the Dunn report and the Kaysen task force all 
recommended the establishment of Federal economic data centers in the late 1960s.6 This in 
turn led coders to build data management systems into software and scientific projects. The 
 
5  For example, MIT, the Department of Economics and the business school purchased an 
IBM1620, and at the Cambridge (UK) Department of Applied Economics, the ESDAC2 was 
replaced by a Titan computer. 
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many macroeconometric models developed during the 1950s and 1960s—Brookings, MIT-
Fed-Penn, Saint Louis, Data Resources Incorporated (DRI), Office of Business Economics 
(OBE) Wharton—had become operational and their forecasts, and associated database and 
time-sharing computing services were commercialized by firms including Otto Eckstein’s 
Data Resources Inc., Michael Evans’s Chase Econometrics and Klein’s Wharton 
Econometric Forecasting. The software developed by economists affiliated with these 
practices, such as DRI’s EPS software, or Chase’s XSIM displayed greater concerns with 
data management and ease of use. The development of panel data projects, such as the Panel 
Survey on Income Dynamics and the National Income Longitudinal Survey fostered the 
spread of applied microeconomics techniques, such as fiscal microsimulations (Sutherland 
1999).  
 
Cheaper and more reliable computers did not merely result in the more widespread 
application of existing econometric techniques. They also supported new modeling strategies. 
The simulation techniques separately introduced by Forrester and Orcutt at MIT were further 
explored by their founders, yet met growing resistance in some fields.7 For instance, the use 
of dynamic systems simulation to show that the western model of economic growth was 
unsustainable in the Limits to Growth report of the Meadows Committee, published 1972, 
created a stir. Simulation models were accused of being too sensitive to ad hoc parameters 
specifications. Two years later, political scientist Howard Alker (1974) argued that computer 
simulation should considered “inelegant mathematics and worse social science.” Other 
simulation models, based on Von Neumann’s theory of automata were also investigated. In 
                                                                                                                                                  
6 See Privacy and Efficient Government: proposals for a National Data Center, Harvard Law 
Review  82(2), 400-417. 
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1969, Thomas Schelling presented a dynamic model of segregation in which the interactions 
of agents according to a set of rules produced spatial clustering. Several computer simulations 
of his model were produced in the next decades. The development of computational general 
equilibrium by John Shoven and John Walley likewise represented in break in the traditional 
theoretical approach to general equilibrium models (Ballard and Johnson, this volume). 
Finally, computerization made possible experiments that could generate data, test theories 
and produce economic models. Implementing auction schemes required new software and 
networked computers. 
 
 
Personal computers and the internet (since 1981)  
In 1981 IBM introduced the Personal Computer (PC), which supported a range of 
programming languages, though its capacity was initially limited by data storage being 
confined to 5¼ inch floppy diskettes. Larger scale applications had to await the fitting of 
10MB hard drives in 1983. Mainframe computers, often with punched card input remained 
the staple of economic computing for much of the decade, for it was not till after 1985 that 
software written for mainframes gradually spread to PCs. New software developed to run 
under Microsoft’s new operating system, MS DOS, in particular STATA, handled data 
management, graphical analysis, time series, cross section and panel econometrics. The 
software business expanded and diversified. Alongside the special purpose software 
economists understood were necessary for the spread of their techniques (PLATO and 
MUDA for experiments, AUTOBOX for time series, Winsolve for Real Business Cycle 
modeling, BACC for Bayesian analysis), general purpose software was widely used, as well 
                                                                                                                                                  
7 For a history of simulation in economics, see Morgan (2012, ch.8) 
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as a new type of package based on high level programming and matrix language (Gauss, 
Matlab, R). 
 
As the internet developed, the possibilities for new sources of data increased 
dramatically, especially when computerization of business created new sources of data. 
Computerization of financial markets in the mid-1980s made possible the use of high-
frequency data, first in equity markets (in the 1980s) and then in foreign exchange markets 
(in the 1990s). Economists were quick to see the potential of minute-by-minute or 
transaction-by-transaction data for studying what has been termed the “microstructure” of 
markets, but this involved not just having computers sufficiently powerful to analyze large 
data sets but also getting access to the data.8 Private suppliers of data were sometimes 
reluctant to make it available to academics. For example, Charles Goodhart, for an early 
study of foreign exchange markets, had to resort to filming the screen on which prices were 
being broadcast, using a video camera, and then replaying the tape to transcribe the numbers.9 
 
Developments in hardware and software gave economists greater independence in 
their computer-based practices, which fostered two types of development. Computer-related 
practices were institutionalized through the establishment of journals, societies and institutes. 
The journal Computer Science in Economics and Management, was founded 1988. The Santa 
Fe Institute began operating in 1984, the Society for Computational Economics was founded 
in 1995, the Argonne/University of Chicago Institute on Computational Economics was 
 
8  There was also great interest in the theoretical analysis of the microstructure of financial 
markets at this time (e.g. Kyle 1985; Glosten and Milgrom 1985). The relationship between 
such theoretical work and empirical work needs further research. 
9  Our source is a conversation with Goodhart. 
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founded in 2007. This period saw the emergence of textbooks and manifestos for new ways 
of doing economics, from the first Santa Fe manifesto on “the economy as an evolving 
complex system” to the advocacy of agent-based modeling Doyne Farmer and Duncan Foley 
published in Nature in 2009. 
  
The flourishing computer-based economic modeling strategies received very varied 
attention from the bulk of economists. Econometrics had become such a routine activity that 
with the exception of a few specialists in economic theory, most young economists engaged 
in some form of data analysis or other computer-based practices. Computer-assisted 
experiments had benefited from better infrastructure, as exemplified by Vernon Smith’s 
Arizona Economic Science Lab and Charles Plott’s Caltech EPPS lab, founded in 1985 and 
1987 respectively. Computerization and the internet were also important through the 
development of large private markets such as Ebay and Amazon, creating a demand from 
business for expertise in areas such as mechanism design and experiments. IT giants such as 
Google and Microsoft invested heavily in economic expertise. Other approaches to economic 
modeling fostered by computerization include Santa Fe’s agent-based Modeling (Axtell and 
Epstein 1996), numerical methods (Judd 1998) and automated theorem proving (Kerber 
Rowat 2014). 
 
3. What do computers do for economists? 
 
The most obvious role for computers has been to improve the speed and accuracy 
with which routine calculations are performed . This is clearest in the earliest 
uses of computers to solve input-output models, to estimate regression coefficients and to 
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simulate. In such cases, they were performing tasks that would otherwise be done “manually” 
using desk calculators. Such applications of computers need not involve any change in the 
way economists conceive their subject: they can simply work more efficiently. Some agent-
based modeling also falls into this category. However, at some point the in increase 
computing power increases the complexity of the problems that can be solved to the extent 
that it becomes more appropriate to see computers as enabling economists to solve 
new problems . This happened very early. Orcutt’s work on autocorrelation in the late 
1940s involved a volume of calculations that would have taken so long to do manually that it 
amounts to a new way of analyzing data. Related to this is enabling economists to 
develop or try out new techniques . When the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) Computer Research Center for Economics and Management  Science, 
extended TROLL after 1972, one of its aims was allowing the development of new 
techniques, partly through allowing users to combine a variety of methods. One of the 
techniques they developed was the Kalman Filter, and its extension the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter (see Boumans 2004, pp. 240-2). Likewise, resampling techniques such as bootstrapping 
or jackknifing had been theorized in the late 1940s, but, according to LSE statistician James 
Durbin, were not implemented for decades because “the computing problem was really rather 
severe” (Phillips 1988, 137).  
 
 Computers also enabled  economists to run simulations or experiments 
that generate new evidence. Such work blurs the boundaries between theoretical and 
applied research. When Alvin Hansen and Paul Samuelson simulated the behavior of the 
multiplier-accelerator model in 1939 (calculations that were too simple to need computers, 
though the principle is the same) they were investigating the properties of a theoretical 
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model, concerned with all possible parameter values. Had they gone on to compare the 
behavior of their system with data on economic activity, as Ragnar Frisch had done earlier in 
the 1930s, we might describe the same exercise as applied (it certainly would have been had 
they calibrated their coefficients in the light of what they found). From here, there is a 
continuum through guessed parameter values to parameter values that are derived from real-
world data. In the early 1950s, when digital computing was still very rudimentary, analog 
computers were used extensively for simulation, not just of business cycles (e.g. Strotz et al 
1953) but also market equilibrium (e.g. Enke 1951; Strotz et al 1951) and the behavior of 
inventories (e.g. Morehouse et al 1950). 
 
 Such work took off in the years around 1960, with the increased availability of digital 
computers (see Morgan 2004). Martin Shubik produced a bibliography on “Simulation, 
gaming, artificial intelligence and allied topics” (1960) that cited nine books, three 
bibliographies and 147 articles on simulation, with a further two books and 37 articles on 
“Monte Carlo”. Given that the boundaries between categories were blurred, items in the 
“systems” and “gaming” categories might also have involved simulation. For example, the 
borderline between experiments (real decision makers in a simulated environment) and 
simulation (where the results are simulated) was far from clear cut (Morgan 2004, p. 355. A 
symposium on simulation in the American Economic Review the same year showed the 
breadth of work encompassed by simulation: business simulations, simulation of individuals 
and entire systems. 
 
Computing also allowed the increased and more reliable storage, retrieval and 
graphical exploration of bigger pre-existing data sets . In his reminiscience, 
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Durbin (in Phillips 1988, 139), for instance, shows acute awareness that statistical techniques 
have to be kept “simple, or applied workers don’t use it.” He recalled, “I thought the 
cumulative periodogram […] would provide applied workers in econometrics with a practical 
way of looking at the higher autocorrelation properties of a series […] I did meet a number of 
people who had got it programmed as part of regression packages, but they had not gotten the 
graphics in. They only had the result of the formal test […] So the outcome was a little 
disappointing in terms of practical take-up.” By the late 1990s, software routinely allowed 
graphical display of results. This user-friendliness was, according to Holly Sutherland (1999), 
was the key to the influence that economic models – tax microsimulations, for instance – 
could have on applied research and policy design.10 
 
Hardware and software improvements also enabled the generation of new data  
such as real-time data on individual transactions and behaviors were increasingly recorded in 
actual markets, but data were also generated via experimentation in economists’ 
laboratories.11 The ability to process very large data sets has been crucial to recent work in 
micro-econometrics. These developments came later for technological reasons. Dramatic 
increases in the speed of computation came about in stages, some very early, but 
developments in data storage and retrieval were greatly stimulated by the growth of 
networking and the internet in the late 1970s and 1980s. It was not until the 1970s that large 
data banks were developed for both academic and commercial use, and hence econometric 
software took time to reflect this. Subsequent watersheds occurred as various markets were 
computerized, enabling real-time data on behaviors and prices to be recorded: trading data in 
 
10 Verena Halsmayer (this volume) similarly explained that the visual display of simulations was central in 
convincing Norway policy-makers to use Leontief’s multi-sector growth model for planning purpose.  
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the late 1980s, then government and private market data in the 2000s (Einav and Levin 
2014). These “big data” sets are growing rapidly and cannot be studied by means of 
traditional techniques, which is in turn fostering the development of new empirical 
techniques , such as machine learning. For example Susan Athey, Guido Imbens and others 
have attempted to merge machine learning with causal inference techniques (Athey and 
Imbens 2015b).12 
 
These developments have contributed to the realization of the hopes expressed by 
Tjalling Koopmans (1957) that existing models would prove to be the prototypes of more 
general and more realistic models through relaxing the constraints on theoretical 
modeling . This covers both the size of models and their complexity. Thus input-output 
models have been disaggregated and with the development of computable general 
equilibrium models, some of the restrictions imposed by linearity have been removed. Macro-
econometric models increased enormously in size but reached their peak in the 1970s, when 
the largest models comprised thousands of equations, after which the constraint on their size 
ceased to be computing power but became the perceived theoretical incoherence of such large 
models. Some economists now hope that new techniques such as agent-based modeling will 
make it possible to remove clearly unrealistic assumptions such as that of the representative 
agent (Geanakoplos et al. 2012). 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
11 See Friedman 1989 for a detailed exposition of how computers changed the way data are collected, why they 
are collected, and what we want the data to tell us.  
12 On machine learning, see http://www.quora.com/How-will-machine-learning-impact-
economics?redirected_qid=6706789. This is not to say that the development of more, better and more diverse 
data in economics has been driven solely by computerization. Authors have emphasized policy demands, the 
need to quantify the self, and many other factors. Nor is the problem of storing, retrieving and analyzing data 
specific to the post 1970 era (see for instance Lemov 2015). 
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At the beginning of the 1980s, a team at the Argonne National Laboratory, near 
Chicago, developed an Automated Reasoning Assistant (AURA; see Dick 2011). When used 
alongside inputs from human mathematicians, this work has challenged mathematicians’ 
ideas about proofs. Such automated theorem proving has only recently been applied to 
economics but its proponents argue that it has the potential to transform economic theory. It 
can prove known theorems  (e.g. Tang and Lin 2009, Kerber, Rowat and Windsteiger 
2011) or discover new theorems  (e.g. Tang and Lin 2011; Geist and Endriss 2011; see 
also Chatterjee and Sen 2014), for instance in game theory or social choice theory. Perhaps, 
more important than either of these is that, through providing new ways to approach theories, 
these methods challenge traditional concepts of proof . If “human thinking has been 
reconfigured through interactions with computing machinery” in mathematics, why might the 
same not happen in economics (Dick 2011: 494)? Kenneth Judd (1997), for instance, has 
relentlessly argued that computational methods could expand the role of economic theory, 
which need not be confined to proving theorems. Other fields such as computational social 
choice, have adopted computational methods of proof.13  
 
Because of the involvement of economists in creating new markets, such as for 
permits to emit harmful gases or for the right to use parts of the radio spectrum for 
telecommunications, the emergence of new markets requiring new modes of 
analysis  should not be seen as a factor external to economics.  New online markets using 
sophisticated types of pricing, new types of auction, digital networks, and new types of 
economic transactions have induced computer scientists to draw on economists’ expertise in 
 
13 This is probably tied to the fact that computer scientists, more than economists per se, have 
pursued the program outlined in Barthioldi, Tovey and Tricks 1989.  
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game theory and market analysis and economists have turned to computer scientists’ 
algorithms and tools in order to analyze these markets.  A recent introduction to the topic 
justifies the turn to computer science by arguing, 
 
Marshallian and Walrasian equilibrium analysis are not theories of how 
markets function. Their institution-free approach to predicting market 
outcomes precludes them from asking questions such as: When do 
market institutions fail? How do they behave when they fail? How 
should markets be designed to minimize failure, and what tradeoffs 
with market efficiency arise in do-ing so? Research in economics 
arising from general equilibrium and welfare economics has been 
concentrated on market imperfections. Computer scientists have paid 
relatively more attention to the nuts and bolts of market mechanisms 
and the robustness of market institutions. (Blume et al. 2015: 2) 
 
The authors suggest that such methods have the potential to change the way markets are 
conceived, seeing work on mechanism design as re-opening issues debated in the 1930s in 
the socialist calculation debate. At a deeper level eventually, it would seem that it is not 
merely computing machines which are changing the face of economics, but the science 
behind the machine which is doing this. Economists have been prone to build economic 
mechanisms into machines (for instance Philips’s MONIAC). They have therefore gradually 
resorted to computer science analogies to understand how economic agents think and how 
markets work. It has been argued that interest has shifted from human behavior to the 
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behavior of markets and that algorithmic metaphors have been used to understand this 
(Mirowski 2007; c.f. Mirowski 2002).  
 
4. Theory and application  
 
How far did computers transform the relationship between theory and applied work?  
 
This account of what improvements in computing have done for economists is 
sufficient to challenge the canonical view that developments in computing inevitably 
encouraged empirical work at the expense of theory. It shows that computerization stimulated 
new practices, from calibration to mechanism design and simulation, which changed the 
relationships between theory and applied work: they changed the way economists construct 
and use models.14 According to many economists, it is such changes in modeling practices 
that have enabled some of the most important leaps in economics knowledge to take place. 
Deaton (2013) noted that what was holding consumer theory back in the 1950s was neither 
the dearth of data nor the lack of computational power: what was needed was new theory, 
framed using mathematical tools that would make it possible to implement the theory so as to 
make sense of seemingly contradictory empirical evidence. He therefore concluded that 
Gorman’s duality theory was a prerequisite to the computerization of consumption models. 
Likewise, in the 1980s, solving the stochastic difference equations of the emerging Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models appeared problematic. “Pencil and paper” 
solutions were not available (and are still generally not). There was, Fernandez-Villaverde 
(2010) argues, a need for new tools that made the estimation and evaluation of DSGE models 
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feasible on desktop computers: this in turn required refinements in both estimation 
techniques, such as Bayesian analysis and Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, and solution 
methods based on linearization and filtering. 
 
According to Al Roth 2002, computerization profoundly changed in the way models 
were written down and what theory was expected to yield. He argues that the interbreeding of 
game theory, experimental and computational economics that gave birth to mechanism design 
pushed economists to  conceive matching algorithms to redesign labor market for American 
doctors.  They would explore the properties of such algorithms in various computational 
experiments, which in turn led to adjustment in the theoretical framework.15 Some new 
methods further blurred the boundaries between theory and application. For example, agent-
based modeling is a way of modeling that doesn’t fit the theory/empirical divide, since 
models not conceived first, then encoded, but are directly conceived as computer programs 
(Gilbert 2008). Interestingly, the computerization of economics has been associated with (or 
has induced) a quest for new epistemological foundations. Simulation has been (re)conceived 
as a third way of doing science (Ostrom 1988). It has been argued that the knowledge 
economists generate is primarily case-based rather than rule-based, implying that reasoning is 
by analogy, irrespective of whether knowledge is based on theory, experiment or empirical 
work. This would place theory and applied work on an equal footing (Gilboa et al. 2014). 
                                                                                                                                                  
14 It is probably no coincidence that one of the few discussions of simulation, a computer-intensive activity, is 
found in a study of modeling (Morgan 2012, chapter 8). 
15 Roth (2002, 1363) explains that “the availability of computation meant that the design 
effort could proceed without waiting for theoretical resolution of outstanding problems 
Computation was used in several quite different ways in the course of the design and 
evaluation of the new medical labor market […] (1) Computational experiments were used in 
the algorithm design. (2) Computational explorations of the data from previous years were 
used to study the effect of different algorithms. (3) Theoretical computation, on simple 
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Yet, transformational as the spread of computers was for economists’ practices, it 
seems that its promises of providing a new integration of theoretical and applied work 
remained largely unfulfilled. Most tools and approaches allowed by computerization, from 
automated theorem proving to computational social choice, from numerical approximation to 
agent-based modeling, have remained challenger methodologies, confined to specialized 
journals. Several explanations of economists’ reluctance to embrace these approaches have 
been provided. Veluppilai (2011) singles out economists’ commitment to an essentially 
Hilbertian paradigm (proofs à la Debreu), and argues that an algorithmic revolution is 
needed. Judd (1997) attributes the slow acceptance of computational methods to the 
reluctance of journal editors to accept such work because they don’t constitute adequate 
proofs. Where automated reasoning does lead to a new proof, it is sometimes possible to find 
a traditional proof, and in such cases it is natural to use this rather than take the risk that an 
editor may not accept the computerized methods by which it was found.16 It is only the use of 
Monte Carlo simulations, and some brands of simulation designed to explore or illustrate the 
behavior of mostly macro-economic models, that has spread widely. In other words, 
simulation is used only as a computational empirical device, or when analytical proofs are 
impossible. Lehtinen and Kuorikoski (2008) argue that economists’ reluctance to use 
simulation as a theoretical tool is grounded in their conception of understanding, which 
requires that an analytical derivation from a set of fundamental axioms is established. To put 
this crudely, for some economists, explaining a phenomenon means deriving it from the 
                                                                                                                                                  
markets to which existing theoretical results apply, was used to understand the effect of 
market size.” 
16 For example, Kerber and Rowat (2014) found a proof using automated reasoning but once 
found, they chose to present a traditional proof. 
 23 
assumption of rational choice.17 Additionally, economists may be more interested in how a 
process unfolds rather than either whether causality can be proven or having precise numbers; 
they have often faulted computer simulation for being a “black box.”  
 
That computerization has failed to transform theorizing and the relationship of theory 
to applied work stands in contrast to what happened in other sciences. In biology, based on 
analogical reasoning, computerization enabled the expansion of computational biology. In 
physics, simulation was understood sometimes as a sampling technique, a tool for the 
solution of integro-differential equations, and as a modeling technique for complex physical 
processes. This variety of approaches, as well as the variety of application to nuclear fission, 
meteorology, chemistry or fluid physics helped creating a subculture and language within the 
discipline, a “trading zone” in the words of Peter Galison 1997, in which simulation was 
made an acceptable method of inquiry for physicists. In postwar linguistics, computers were 
used both to formalize linguistic theories, that is, to implement mathematized syntax and 
manipulate natural language structures, and as an hypothesis-testing tool (Martin-Nielsen 
2012). 
 
Economists’ selective appropriation of empirical techniques fostered by computation 
 
The role computerization played in economics is thus paradoxical. True, it allowed faster 
computation, and enabled the development of a whole array of new empirical techniques and 
approaches. Yet, it largely failed to transform economists’ ideas about economic knowledge 
and how to generate it. On a closer look, furthermore, the rise of applied economics that 
 
17  Not all economists accept either an axiomatic approach or reduction to rational choice as 
the hallmark of explanation. For example Solow (1997) draws a sharp distinction between an 
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computerization has purportedly fueled was highly selective. In particular, some of the most 
computationally-intensive approaches were marginalized at the turn of the 1980s, despite 
getting the computational power they were longing for. Large-scale macroeconometric 
models, for instance, were difficult to build in the 1960s and 1970s because of physical 
constraints. Hundreds of (physical) pages of Fortran code had to be written and debugged; 
data often had to be punched into cards for storage and input, each card possibly holding less 
than a dozen numbers, (and it was easy to drop a stack of cards on the floor) and when the 
output came it would be spread across many metres of fanfold paper. Much still had to be 
done with pencil and paper, including the plotting of graphs.18 For example, when a 
macroeconometric model was being constructed by economists from MIT, the Federal 
Reserve Board and the University of Pennsylvania between 1965 and 1972, doing the first 
simulation took several months. Modern GUI-based software removed many of these 
difficulties, keeping track of everything, meaning that the econometrician’s desktop came to 
look very different. Yet, as computers grew faster and software integrating a wider range of 
techniques, procedures to easily store and retrieve data and plot results (Renfro 2007), the 
empirical results and theoretical and methodological foundations of these models were 
increasingly challenged. These models, the largest of which had around two thousand 
equations, produced by large teams of researchers failed to predict better than simpler models 
(Fromm and Klein (1976)) and their theoretical foundations were challenged. As a result, 
even though it was now much easier to construct and run the models, academic economists 
lost interest in them. However, this did not mean they were abandoned: instead, during the 
                                                                                                                                                  
axiomatic approach and model-building. 
18 The graphs output by early econometric software involved printing ASCII characters in 
suitable places on a large sheet of paper. Instead of a line, a variable would be indicated by a 
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1980s, they were pushed out of academia into private forecasting firms, such as Data 
Resources Incorporated, Wharton and Chase Econometrics, often established by the models’ 
creators. 
 
 Macroeconomists did take up computers but their use in DSGE modeling and macro-
econometric time-series analysis was very different from the use that the builders of 
increasingly complex large-scale forecasting models would have anticipated. We are thus 
uncertain about how computers play out in the adoption of new models and empirical 
techniques in macroeconomics. The rise of calibrated business-cycle models, then calibrated 
and estimated DSGE, seems to be predicated on controversies over theoretical insights and 
perceived biases in econometric techniques rather than a response to computer power 
shortage or advances. Yet, the success of DSGE modeling may have been predicated, in part, 
on the ability of its proponents to yoke to the improvement of hardware and computer 
languages, by shaping mediating tools. “No matter how sound were the DSGE models 
presented by the literature or how compelling the arguments for Bayesian inference,” 
Fernandez-Villaverde 2010 writes, “the whole research program would not have taken off 
without the appearance of the right set of tools that made the practical implementation of the 
estimation of DSGE models feasible in a standard desktop computer. Otherwise, we would 
probably still be calibrating our models.” Crucial to the development of the DSGE approach 
was not only Bayesian estimation and Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, but also their 
translation into software such as BRAP and DYNARE. The development of software has 
been central to computerization of the discipline (Renfro 2007). Time series has a variety of 
                                                                                                                                                  
series of asterisks, the degree of precision limited by line spacing and character widths of the 
font. 
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user-friendly packages, experimentalists developed MUDA, and some agent-based 
proponents believe their approach would be more widely accepted if they developed software 
that is easy to use.  
 
That experimental economists in the 1970s and 1980s immediately understood that 
the development of their own software was key to development of newly established 
computerized experimental laboratories played a role in the “experimental turn”: Stephen 
Rassenti’s constant updating of PLATO at Vernon Smith’s Economic Science Laboratory 
gave them a head start, while MUDA, developed at Charles Plott’s Caltech EEPS, was 
distributed to over ninety universities in the next years, thereby contributing to “the lowering 
of costs of entry to experimental economics” (Svorencik 2015, 99).  Yet, what the case of 
experimental economics shows is that computerization, although a condition for the 
development of experiment and use by mechanism designers, for instance, was far from 
sufficient to ensure the success of the new approach. For instance, Svorencik 2015 argues that 
a lavishly funded computer laboratory set up at Berkeley in 1960 failed not because 
computing was inadequate but because its creator focused too much on building 
infrastructure and not enough on building a community: the recent take-off in experimental 
economics was required much more than the acquisition of suitable hardware. In the same 
vein, the success of the blend of game theory, experiments and computational science which 
came to be known as mechanism design required constant advocacy toward funders, public 
agencies, policy makers and business (Lee 2016). 
 
The situation is even more complicated in microeconomics. A promising approach in 
the 1970s seemed to be Computable General Equilibrium, one that heavily relied on up-to-
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date computational power to calibrate its models. These were so complex that in the last years 
of the 1970s, researchers had to shrink the number of variables and even when they had done 
this, a simulation could still take six hours. By 1981, the first desktop computers had been 
adopted, it was no longer necessary to shrink the number of variables and computation time 
was a matter of minutes. Yet, the computable general equilibrium community was divided on 
whether to use calibration and estimation, and their models were generally considered “black-
boxes,” some “a bit dubious, [..] produc[ing] results that cannot be traced to an accessibly 
small set of simple assumptions (Rauscher 1999, quoted in Ballard and Johnson 2016). Better 
hardware did nothing to curb the decline in computable general equilibrium modeling. And 
the empirical methods which would emerge triumphant from the 1980s crisis in 
econometrics, quasi-experimental techniques, appear much less computationally-intensive 
than the structural econometrics they were intended to supersede.19  The bibliometric 
evidence provided by Biddle and Hamermesh (this volume) suggests that these new empirical 
techniques have been successful not through the redefinition of links between theory and 
applied work afforded by computerization, but through enabling empirical work to be 
undertaken without being tied to theory. 
 
5. Concluding remarks  
 
We do not wish to challenge the claim that the growth of computers was central to the 
transformation of economics in the past thirty to forty years. It clearly was. Economists have 
 
19 The development of new databases, as well as emulation with medical science, is central to 
the story told by David Card and Alan Krueger in a recent interview, but computers do not 
even appear once (see 
http://davidcard.berkeley.edu/interviews/interview%20with%20Card%20and%20Krueger.pdf
658867308 ).  For a history of the “credibility revolution,” see Panhans and Singleton 2016.  
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used computers to do many things that they could never have done without them and some of 
these practices have become central to the field. Rather, our claim is that the growth of 
computers is not sufficient to explain the turn towards applied economics that is documented 
in this volume. Beginning in the 1980s, some computationally very intensive techniques were 
marginalized, and computationally less demanding approaches based on quasi-experiments 
became widely used in microeconomics. Of course, most of these modeling strategies require 
a minimum hardware and software equipment beyond anything that was available a few 
decades ago, but beyond this basic level, we suggest that computerization is neither sufficient 
nor sometimes even necessary to explain the success of the those empirical approaches that 
have been widely adopted 
The story of the transformation of applied economics therefore needs to be related not 
just to the rise of computing but to other dimensions of the context in which economists were 
working: to policy challenges, such as the creation of new types of market (McMillan 2003), 
to changes in the issues that concerned economists, to social changes such as the acceptability 
of making proprietary data available to researchers (Taylor et al. 2014), and to new demands 
from business.20 The impact of computerization was itself conditional upon the development 
and implementation of strategies for bringing models to the machine, such as the 
development of coding skills, software, laboratories, training programs, and interdisciplinary 
communities. Finally, in order to understand how economics was transformed, and the turn to 
applied economics, account needs to be taken not only of the rise of computing but of how 
economists conceived economic theory and its relationship to empirical work. Though the 
rise of computers could be studied in relation to either theory (very limited impact) or 
 
20 https://www.quora.com/Why-do-technology-companies-hire-economists-and-what-is-their-
contribution?redirected_qid=6705502 
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application (substantial impact) in isolation, it is more useful to take a broader view. It is 
possible that the eventual effect of computerization will be to challenge accepted notions of 
theoretical and applied work. 
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